Malcolm Sharp and the Rosenberg Case:
Remembrance of Things Past
Abe Krash

The Rosenberg case is significant as a human occurrence, as
a social phenomenon, and as a puzzle in proof.
Sharp, Was Justice Done? 18 (1956)
I.
There have been few moments in the Supreme Court in recent years
which surpassed in tension and drama the final oral argument on
Thursday, June 18, 1953, in the Rosenberg case.1 The trial and sentence of the Rosenbergs in 1951 had provoked a worldwide furore
which had mounted in intensity as the execution date approached.
Pickets and counterpickets were parading in front of the White House
that Thursday afternoon, and a crowd of several thousand persons
packed the Supreme Court building and stood outside on the steps.
The procedural status of the matter was likewise extraordinary. Three
days previously, on Monday, June 15, the Court had recessed until
October after denying, by a vote of 5 to 4, a petition by the Rosenbergs
for a stay of execution. On Tuesday, a new motion for a stay had been
presented to Mr. Justice Douglas. Lawyers appearing for an amicus
argued that the penalty provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 2 -specifically the requirement that no death sentence be imposed in a case
involving atomic espionage without a jury recommendation-superseded the Espionage Act of 19173 under which the Rosenbergs had
been indicted and convicted. Throughout the day on Tuesday, Mr.
Justice Douglas had pondered the motion. Then, on Wednesday morning, June 17, he granted the stay; he felt that the point raised was a

"substantial one which should be decided [only] after full argument
and deliberation." A few hours after the stay was granted, Attorney
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General Brownell filed an application with Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
asking that a special term of the Court be convened to review and
vacate the stay granted by Mr. Justice Douglas. This application was
granted, and for the third time in its entire history the Supreme Court
was reconvened during its vacation recess for a special term.
I was present in the courtroom as a spectator that Thursday afternoon thirteen years ago. It was my practice, and that of other young
lawyers in Washington, to attend argument in noteworthy cases. I
recall my sense of surprise at seeing Malcolm Sharp sitting at the table
reserved for counsel for petitioners. What was this diffident, softspoken professor of contract and commercial law doing in the Supreme
Court at the climactic moment of a great spy case? Sharp taught contract to first year law students at Chicago; I had been one of his
students in 1947. I had anticipated that a course in contract would
be as dull as dishwater. I had not reckoned with Malcolm Sharp. Who
among those who studied under him will ever forget the exquisite
subtlety with which he probed the old problems of offer and acceptance, consideration, and mutual mistake? Sharp did not view the law
of contract as a sterile set of black letter propositions. The life of the
law to him is not logic; it is psychology, economics, semantics, history,
and philosophy; the life of the law is the bustle of the marketplace and
the need for fair, commonsense accommodations. Sharp's students were
exposed to the workings of a highly cultivated mind, sensitive, precise,
and provocative.
If "the Sacco-Vanzetti case united the liberals," David Riesman and
Nathan Glazer were later to write, "the Rosenberg case divided them." 5
The explosion of an atomic weapon by the Russians in 1949; the Hiss
case; the war in Korea; the Truman loyalty program for government
employees; Senator McCarthy's claims that the State Department was
overrun by Communists-these had left the liberal community in the
United States in 1950 in disarray. The Rosenberg indictments and trial
followed hard on the heels of those events. While there were many
thoughtful persons who were uneasy and even shocked by a death
sentence imposed in peacetime on both husband and wife-no civil
court had ever imposed this penalty in an espionage case-there were
very few who believed the Rosenbergs to be innocent.
Sharp is one of those few. Like many others, Sharp, as he revealed
in his book Was Justice Done?, had at first been an "uneasy spectator"
of the Rosenbergs' trial.6 Like many others, he was disquieted by the
5 Riesman & Glazer, The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes, 22 PARTISAN REV. 64
(1955).
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severity of the punishment.7 He had been impressed, however, by
the "careful and convincing" opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which had affirmed the conviction.8 A study of the
record in the case, he was later to write, did not shake his confidence
in the correctness of the verdict. Then, in May 1953, when it appeared
that all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, there was a report of
newly discovered evidence. At the trial, Ruth Greenglass-the Rosenbergs' sister-in-law-testified for the prosecution that about 1946 she
had noticed and admired a mahogany console table in the Rosenbergs'
apartment. Ethel Rosenberg told her it was a gift, and Julius Rosenberg,
Ruth testified, said "it was a special kind of table." Mrs. Greenglass said
that Julius had turned the table on its side to show her that "there
was a portion of the table that was hollowed out for a lamp to
fit underneath it so the table could be used for photograph purposes .

. . ."I

The inference was plain: the Russians had given Julius

Rosenberg a "special" table, suitable for photographing documents.
Julius Rosenberg testified that he had purchased a console table at
Macy's for about $20 and that there was nothing "special" about the
table. The table was not produced at the trial. Two years after the
trial, in May 1953, counsel for the Rosenbergs claimed to have found
the table which fitted the description given of it at the trial by the
Rosenbergs: an inexpensive piece of furniture purchased by the Rosenbergs at Macy's and in no way adapted for photography. Sharp was
impressed by this claim. 10 In his view, the discovery of the table, if
proved by reliable witnesses, would have had a devastating effect on
the credibility of the Greenglasses, who were key witnesses against the
Rosenbergs. In mid-May 1953 Sharp, who still had no official connection with the case, was moved to make a public statement in which
he deplored the severity of the sentences and urged careful consideration of the "new evidence."1 1 A few weeks later, Sharp was invited
by counsel for the Rosenbergs to assist them, and during the final
month before the Rosenbergs were executed he was fully and deeply
engaged as counsel in their defense. It was in this capacity that he sat
in the Supreme Court that Thursday afternoon thirteen years ago.
What led Malcolm Sharp to become involved-without compensation, it should be noted-in a great cause celebr6 for two of the most
despised defendants in our history? Several years after the case was
7 Id. at 9.

8 Ibid. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
9 The testimony is quoted in SHAm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 51-53.
10 Id. at 14.
11 Ibid.
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over, Sharp offered an explanation in his book Was Justice Done?.
"What moved me," he wrote, "apart from a growing fear of serious
injustice in a capital case of peculiar public concern, was a sense of the
relationship of the case to public policy, both domestic and foreign.
A calm estimate of spy scares seems to me a part of a calm estimate of
foreign quarrels, the resolution of which might help us to preserve our
liberties, promote prosperity, save taxes, and keep the peace."' 2 To this
somewhat impersonal account, I would add that, in my view, Sharp
was moved by a sense of compassion for individuals confronting great
odds and the overwhelming power of the state. This same compassion-the same largeness of spirit and the same respect for the underdog-had led Malcolm Sharp to fight in the 1940's for the admission of
Negro students into the law school at the University of Oklahoma
and later to champion the right of one of his students, George
Anastaplo, to refuse to state whether he was a member of the Communist Party as a precondition to admission to the bar.' 3 The Populist
tradition of respect for dissenters and mavericks is rooted deep in
Sharp.
Sharp's book discusses many of the key issues of the case. He examines
the credibility of the prosecution's four principal witnesses-the Greenglasses, Harry Gold, and Elizabeth Bentley, each a self-confessed spy.
He is especially critical of the casual attention accorded by the courts
to the discovery and importance of the console table. Sharp writes
thoughtfully of the dangers inherent in the use of testimony by accomplices who are witnesses for the prosecution and of the passions aroused
by a trial like that of the Rosenbergs. The book also relates Sharp's personal involvement in the case and the desperate efforts made by the
defense in the final month before execution.
While Sharp has since 1953 steadfastly adhered to a belief in the innocence of the Rosenbergs, I am among those who are not convinced
that the Rosenbergs were innocent but who feel the death sentence
was wrong. Although Sharp's book did not induce me to change my
opinion, it raised many troublesome questions concerning the case to
which I know no satisfactory answers.
II.
The Rosenberg case, Sharp wrote, is significant in part as a "puzzle
in proof."'14 In the decade since the case ended, there have been no
disclosures or developments which would definitively solve the puzzle.
12

Id. at xxxiv.
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Some of the puzzling questions presented by the case are posed by
Dr. Harold Urey, the distinguished scientist, in a brief but thoughtful
introduction he wrote to Sharp's book. Is it probable, for example, that
Rosenberg used his own name "Julius" as a codeword in telephoning
Elizabeth Bentley and that his name was the password Harry Gold
was instructed to use in identifying himself to Greenglass-if Julius
Rosenberg was in fact the head of a spy ring and anxious to avoid detection? Is it probable, as the Greenglasses testified, that the Russians
gave the Rosenbergs a console table to photograph documentscertainly a clumsy, easily exposed device? And is it likely that Greenglass-who had only a high school education and no advance training
in mathematics or physics-could have assimilated, memorized, and
transmitted vital technical information? Presumably, these questions
were resolved by the jury adversely to the Rosenbergs, but a jury
verdict is not equivalent to scientific proof and does not silence all
doubt and discussion.
Emmett Hughes wrote in his memoirs of the Eisenhower administration that the Rosenberg case was discussed by the Cabinet while it
was pending before the Supreme Court. Hughes states that Attorney
General Brownell told President Eisenhower: "I've always wanted you
to look at evidence that wasn't usable in court showing the Rosenbergs
were the head and center of an espionage ring here in direct contact
with the Russians-the prime espionage ring in the country."'15 Hughes,
however, reports nothing further concerning this discussion.
We know little more about another official attempt to allay doubts
concerning the Rosenbergs' guilt. In 1956, Attorney General Brownell
ordered a full report on the case to be prepared by the Department of
Justice, apparently with a view toward publication of a "white paper." 16
A department attorney was reportedly given complete access to the FBI
files and to all of the evidence in the department's possession, and he
interviewed various witnesses, members of the prosecutor's staff, and
Sobell and Greenglass. Unfortunately, the report was never made
public.
Recently, a fresh reappraisal of the case has been made by two
journalists in private life, Walter and Miriam Schneir, in an interesting
book entitled Invitation to an Inquest. Hitherto, critics of the case,
including Sharp, have acknowledged that Gold and Greenglass were engaged in a conspiracy to commit espionage, but these critics have maintained that Rosenberg and Sobell had nothing to do with this conspiracy
15 HUGHES, TnE ORDEAL

OF

Powaa 79-80 (1965).

16 See SCHNEIR & SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 296-98 (1965). For Sharp's views of

the Schneir's book, see Sharp, Book Review, The Progressive, Jan. 1966, p. 40.
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and were wrongfully implicated by perjury. In essence this was the
theory of the defense. The Schneirs, on the other hand, advance the
startling thesis that the Rosenbergs and Sobell "were punished for a
crime that never occurred."' 7 Gold and Greenglass, they claim, never
met each other prior to their arrests, and no secret information was ever
transmitted.
As the Schneirs point out, the critical episode in the case was an
alleged meeting between Gold and Greenglass in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, on June 3, 1945. It was at this meeting that Greenglass
allegedly turned over to Gold secret information concerning the atomic
bomb. This was also the meeting at which Gold allegedly identified
himself to Greenglass as the courier by matching one-half of a jello
box which he held with one-half held by Greenglass, and by using
the now famous password, "I came from Julius."' 8 At the trial, Gold
testified that he arrived in Albuquerque on Saturday night, June 2,
1945; that he found a room for the night in a rooming house; that on
Sunday morning, June 3, he registered at the Hilton Hotel; and that
late that morning he met the Greenglasses, received the information,
and turned over $500 in payment.'
The Schneirs examined a photocopy of Gold's hotel registration card
which was placed in evidence at the trial. The face of the card, filled
in by hand by the Hilton Hotel clerk, bears the date "6-3-45," but the
time stamp on the back of the card is the following day, June 4, 1945.
Starting from this curious discrepancy, the Schneirs build an argument
that the hotel card was a forgery, that Gold in fact never was in
Albuquerque on June 3 or 4, and that he never met Greenglass at that
time.2 0 Another basis for the Schneirs' conclusion is a series of recorded
interviews between Gold and his attorney which took place in June,
1950, before Greenglass was arrested. There are noteworthy differences
between Gold's statements to his counsel at that time and his subsequent testimony at the trial with respect to the meeting with Greenglass. In his statement to his lawyer, for example, Gold made no
mention of the jello box or of the "Julius" password 21-items of
evidence so striking that it is hard to believe he would have neglected
to mention them.
The Schneirs argue that Gold was a thoroughly unreliable person,
given to wild fantasies and a desire for self-glorification. They argue
'7

Id. at 403.

is Id. at 136.
10 Gold's testimony is quoted id. at 378.
20 Id. ch. 29.
21

Id. at 401.
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also that Greenglass was emotionally unstable, untruthful, and fearful
of being prosecuted for stealing property from the Government. They
quote the government attorney who studied the matter in behalf of
the Attorney General in 1956 as saying that Greenglass was a man "with
no conscience at all," and, "If I were a judge, I wouldn't take his
testimony too seriously. '22 Gold and Greenglass were together in the
same prison for a number of months, and the Schneirs maintain that
they collaborated while in custody in fabricating the account which
they gave at the trial. The Schneirs' argument, however, assumes that
representatives of the FBI and Justice Department attorneys suborned
perjury by Gold and Greenglass and fabricated evidence. A charge of
this extreme nature demands very strong, clearcut proof and, in my
view, the book falls far short of substantiating this grave accusation.
III.
23
The fate of the Rosenbergs is a subject of interest only to historians,
but the fate of Morton Sobell-who was tried and convicted as a coconspirator with them-remains as an insistently practical problem,
for Sobell is still confined in a federal penitentiary. He has served
14 years of a 30-year sentence. Convinced of Sobell's innocence, Sharp
for many years has worked with others to secure a new trial, a pardon,
or parole for Sobell.
The case against Sobell rested essentially on the testimony of a
single witness, Max Elitcher. Sobell and Elitcher had been classmates
together in high school and college, and afterwards, in 1940-1941, they
shared an apartment together in Washington, D.C., where they were
both employed by the Navy Bureau of Ordnance. Elitcher testified
that on several occasions he was urged by Julius Rosenberg to provide
classified military information for transmittal to the Russians. He
Id. at 349.
In the thirteen years since the execution, there have been two legal developments
worthy of note which would have altered the procedure-although probably not the outcome-of the trial. First, there has been a change in the permissible scope of cross-examination in federal criminal trials. Ethel Rosenberg had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination while appearing before the grand jury, but at the trial she testified as to matters
she had previously refused to discuss. On cross-examination the prosecution elicited the fact
that she had previously pleaded the fifth amendment. In 1957, the Supreme Court, invoking
its supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,
ruled such cross-examination is impermissible; the use of constitutional privilege cannot
be used to discredit a person who asserts it. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957).
Second, in a post-conviction proceeding, Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second
Circuit, held that Sobell could properly have asked the jury to decide whether, if he had
joined the conspiracy, he had done so when the United States was no longer at war within
the meaning of the Espionage Act. United States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 329 (2d Cir. 1963).
A favorable finding would have led to a lower sentence.
22

23
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further testified that he had been asked by Sobell for the names of
young engineers who might furnish military data. Elitcher said that
Sobell (who was then employed by General Electric) had expressed
interest in a gunnery control report on which Elitcher was working.
Finally, Elitcher testified that in 1948 he drove from Washington to
New York and on arrival told Sobell he thought he had been followed
by FBI agents. He described a dramatic midnight ride with Sobell from
Sobell's home in Flushing, New York, to Knickerbocker Village in Manhattan (where Julius Rosenberg lived) for the purpose of delivering a
can of film containing allegedly valuable information.
Evidence was introduced that in June 1950, after Greenglass was
arrested, Sobell took his wife and children to Mexico. He wrote
letters to a friend in the United States using an alias and traveled about
Mexico employing various aliases. Sobell was "kidnapped" by agents
of the Mexican government and turned over to United States authorities. At the trial Sobell, on the advice of counsel, did not take the
stand, and no evidence was offered in his behalf.
Elitcher's credibility has been challenged by various critics of the
case who point out that Elitcher had lied in filling out a government
employment form by denying former Communist party membership.
How reliable, they ask, is the testimony of a confessed Communist
and a confessed perjurer who admitted on the stand that he was
frightened and hoped for clemency? There was no corroborative testimony or extrinsic objective evidence to confirm what Elitcher said.
One is thus forced to believe either Elitcher or Julius Rosenberg's
denials. In post-trial affidavits, Sobell contradicted Elitcher's charges,
but because Sobell's statements were never subjected to cross-examination their value is diminished.
Those who think Sobell innocent also have difficulty in accounting for his strange behavior in Mexico. It is true that evidence of flight
is treacherous proof; Sobell may have fled to Mexico, as the prosecuting
authorities claimed, because he was guilty, but he may have gone for
innocent reasons. In post-conviction proceedings, Sobell stated that he
was "apprehensive over signs of political intimidation and repression
in [the United States];" that he and his wife had been engaged in
leftwing political activities and had seen scientists "harassed and
persecuted for no more than their opinions and associations;" and that
he felt that because of his views and acquaintance with Rosenberg he
"would be slapped into jail on one pretext or another." 24 But what
can one say about the clumsy attempts he made to conceal his identity?
24 SCHNEIR & SCHNEIR, op. cit. supra note

16, at 332-33.
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Even persons sympathetic to Sobell have written that "whether one
assumes Sobell to have been a fugitive spy or a would-be political
refugee, the fact is that many aspects of his behavior while in Mexico
seem to preclude any rational motive." He behaved, they note, "as a
fearful and confused individual who acted out of complex and at least
'25
partially obscure motives.
Assuming, however, that Sobell was properly convicted, the issue
at present is whether there are solid grounds for parole. A good case
can be made in support of executive dispensation.
In the first place, there has always been a serious question whether
Sobell was prejudiced by being tried with the Rosenbergs. There
was never any evidence offered that Sobell had anything to do with
purloining atomic secrets from Los Alamos. There may well have
been one conspiracy involving Rosenberg, Greenglass, and Harry Gold,
and a separate, different conspiracy involving Rosenberg and Sobell.
The Court of Appeals rejected this separate conspiracy argument, but
Judge Jerome Frank-an exceedingly able and astute judge, who
wrote the opinion for the court affirming the Rosenbergs' conviction
-dissented from the ruling as to Sobell. 26 He felt that the jury should
have been instructed to consider whether Sobell was part of a general
conspiracy to transmit any kind of military information, or whether
he was a member of a "different" conspiracy to transmit only certain
types of military information. The point that Sobell was prejudiced
by being tried with the Rosenbergs is certainly not frivolous, and it
could properly be weighed in considering a parole application.
Of greater immediate relevance perhaps is the fact that Sobell has
served nearly half of a very long sentence and that, according to various
accounts, he has been a model prisoner. His wife has remained loyal
to him and has carried on a remarkable campaign in his behalf. The
passions which surrounded the case have long since died down, and it
is unlikely that his parole would precipitate widespread political controversy. His release would be a humane ending to a grim and tragic
chapter in this country's history.
25 Id. at 336, 838.
26 See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 601 (2d Cir. 1952).

